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The Anti-Human Rights Machine:
Digital Authoritarianism and The Global Assault on Human
Rights
Richard Ashby Wilson*
ABSTRACT
Across the world, governments and state-aligned actors increasingly target
human rights defenders online using techniques such as surveillance,
censorship, harassment, and incitement, which together have been termed
“digital authoritarianism.” We currently know little about the concrete
effects on human rights defenders of digital authoritarianism as researchers
have focused primarily on hate speech targeting religious, national, and
ethnic minority groups. This article analyzes the effects of digital
authoritarianism in two countries with among the highest rates of killings of
human rights defenders in the world; Colombia and Guatemala. Anti-human
rights speech in these countries portrays defenders as Marxist terrorists who
are anti-patriotic and corrupt criminals. Evidence for a direct causal link to
offline violence and killing is limited, however, and this empirical study
documents the non-lethal and conditioning effects of speech. Human rights
defenders who are targeted online report negative psychological and health
outcomes and identify a nexus between online harassment and the
criminalization of human rights work. Many take protective measures,
engage in self-censorship, abandon human rights work, and leave the
country. To prevent these harms, social media companies must implement
stronger human rights-protective measures in at-risk countries, including
expediting urgent requests for physical protection, adopting context-specific
content moderation policies, and publicly documenting state abuses. The
article concludes by advocating for a new United Nations-sponsored Digital
Code of Conduct that would require states to adopt transparent digital
policies, refrain from inciting attacks, and cease illegally surveilling human
rights defenders.
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INTRODUCTION

The online harassment and threats against Ramón Cadena Rámila began
in 2018 when a vitriolic column in the Guatemalan daily newspaper El
Periódico spread quickly on social media. Ramón Cadena is one of Central
America’s most prominent human rights attorneys and he has served as a
judge on the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and represented
indigenous and environmental activists opposing hydroelectric and mining
projects. The Foundation Against Terrorism, a group representing military
veterans of Guatemala’s counterinsurgency war, coordinated a campaign on
Twitter and Facebook labeling Cadena a Marxist, a liar, and a millionaire
who grew rich by stealing his clients’ monetary reparations won in litigation.
Strangers accosted him and his family in restaurants, calling them thieves and
threatening them with violence. Cadena requested government protection.
Receiving none, he sent his teenage daughter to live abroad with family. He
petitioned the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights which ordered
the Guatemalan authorities to provide 24-hour armed police accompaniment.
He suffers from anxiety, insomnia, acid reflux, and every day he takes a
different route to his office at the International Commission of Jurists in
Guatemala City. His concerns are well-founded: from 2018 to 2020, thirty
human rights defenders were killed in Guatemala.1
Across the world, governments and state-aligned actors orchestrate
online harassment campaigns against human rights defenders.2 Government
* Richard Ashby Wilson is the Associate Dean of Faculty Development and
Intellectual Life, Gladstein Chair of Human Rights, and Board of Trustees
Distinguished Professor of Law and Anthropology at the University of Connecticut
School of Law. I appreciate the support I have had from colleagues on this research
project. Specifically, I would like to thank Ginna Anderson, Brittany Benowitz, JoMarie Burt, Sandy Coliver, Eric Curwin, Brian Dooley, Juan Franco, Rachel Lopez,
Richard Parker, Michael Rubin, Jamie Rowen, Rachel Sieder, and Kimberly
Theidon. I am sincerely grateful to the human rights defenders who participated in
this study and who, for their protection and security, cannot be named here. Research
was supported by the Human Rights Institute and School of Law at the University
of Connecticut and by Robert and Mary-Jane Yass. Molly K. Land was a coresearcher in this study and participated in the project design and interviews in
Guatemala in 2019. Research assistants Devon Fray, Juan Gutierrez, Emily Karr,
Paola Leiva, and Danielle J. Nadeau did stellar empirical work. Adway Wadekar
and Danielle J. Nadeau contributed to the statistical analysis.
1

FRONT LINE DEFENDERS, GLOBAL ANALYSIS 2019, at 4 (2020),
https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/resource-publication/global-analysis-2019.
2
“State actors” denotes government officials or agencies and “state-aligned actors”
denotes individuals whose speech on social media aligns closely with the interests of the
government or military. “Human rights defender” is defined by the United Nations Office of
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online propaganda operations have been termed “digital authoritarianism,”3
and are characterized by an array of anti-democratic techniques that include
internet shutdowns, surveillance,4 censorship of online speech,
disinformation, state-sponsored trolling,5 and incitement of violence.6
Governments coordinate online propaganda operations to intimidate and
silence critics and to galvanize popular support for a range of restrictive
measures that include the criminalization of human rights work, and in some
contexts, disappearances and killings.7
This article is the first to provide a theoretical framing of state-aligned
propaganda campaigns against human rights defenders based on quantitative
and qualitative social science research methods. It combines analyses of the
content of the speech directed at defenders with evidence on the impacts of
digital authoritarianism on the professional work and personal lives of
defenders in two countries where human rights defenders are at risk.
Colombia and Guatemala have among the highest numbers of lethal attacks
on human rights defenders in the world and in 2020 ranked number one and
four respectively in the Americas,8 and number one and seven respectively in
the world.9 In the two-year period from 2018 to 2020, 106 defenders were
killed in Colombia and fifteen were killed in Guatemala.10 Attacks on
defenders increased during the COVID-19 pandemic and in 2020, there were
the
High
Commissioner
for
Human
Rights
here:
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/SRHRDefenders/Pages/Defender.aspx.
3
See ADRIAN SHAHBAZ, THE RISE OF DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM (2018) (discussing
the rise of digital authoritarianism); EROL YAYBOKE & SAM BRANNEN, PROMOTE AND
BUILD: A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM (2020) (discussing policy
responses to digital authoritarianism). Ron Deibert defines authoritarianism as “state
constraints on legitimate democratic political participation, rule by emotion and fear,
repression of civil society, and the concentration of executive power in the hands of an
unaccountable elite.” Ron Deibert, Cyberspace Under Siege, 26 J. DEMOCR. 64 (2015).
4
David Kaye (Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/41/35 ¶26 (May 28, 2019).
5
“State-sponsored trolling” is the coordination by an official state agency or party in
government of automated accounts (bots), paid users, and volunteers to harass opponents.
See CARLY NYST & NICK MONACO, INST. FOR THE FUTURE, STATE-SPONSORED TROLLING:
HOW GOVERNMENTS ARE DEPLOYING DISINFORMATION AS PART OF BROADER DIGITAL
HARASSMENT CAMPAIGNS, 1 (2018) (defining and analyzing state-sponsored trolling).
6
See MUNA ABBAS ET. AL, INVISIBLE THREATS: MITIGATING THE RISK OF VIOLENCE
FROM ONLINE HATE SPEECH AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN GUATEMALA (2019)
(describing digital authoritarianism in Guatemala); Tamar Megiddo, Online Activism,
Digital Domination and the Rule of Trolls, 58 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 394 (2020)
(discussing digital domination of civil society organizations by governments).
7
ABBAS ET. AL, supra note 6; Megiddo, supra note 6.
8
See FRONT LINE DEFENDERS, GLOBAL ANALYSIS 2020, (2021),
https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/resource-publication/global-analysis-2020.
9
Id.
10
FRONT LINE DEFENDERS 2019, supra note 1.
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177 killings in Colombia and fifteen in Guatemala.11 Visible physical harms
are only part of the account, however, and detentions and threats also
increased in both countries.12 To comprehend the full picture of a hostile
environment for human rights, researchers need to complement quantitative
measures with qualitative research on the emotional and psychological harms
that defenders experience. 13
The article documents the online content and character of coordinated
online campaigns against human rights defenders and provides a coding
guide listing twelve categories of anti-human rights speech. Digital
authoritarianism has similar characteristics globally that involve accusations
that defenders are subversives or terrorists who are guilty of corruption and
criminality, and it also varies according to the culture, history, and language
of a country.14 In the qualitative interviews conducted for this study,
defenders report many damaging effects not currently captured in the official
datasets, including fear and intimidation, reputational damage, negative
health effects, the need to take protective security measures, and the
suppression of their public speech.15 Online attacks undermine human rights
work on a daily basis, and in extreme instances defenders have fled their
homes and applied for asylum in a foreign country.16 A majority of defenders
interviewed for this study identified a causal nexus between anti-human
rights speech17 online and real-world violence. The minority who refrained
from linking speech to violence still emphasized the ways in which antihuman rights speech conditions a population to tolerate violence against
defenders.18

11

FRONT LINE DEFENDERS 2020, supra note 8. At the height of the COVID-19 pandemic
in March 2020, the populist president of El Salvador Nayib Bukele tweeted that
“organizations of ‘human rights’. . . are on the side of the virus.” @nayibbukele, TWITTER
(Mar.
29,
2020,
5:08
PM),
https://twitter.com/nayibbukele/status/1244370925815988226?lang=en.
12
See U.N. 75 Sess., 8749th mtg. U.N Doc SC/14252 1 (July 14, 2020).
13
See Allison J. Pugh, What Good are Interviews in Thinking About Culture?
Demystifying Interpretive Analysis, 1 AM. J. CULT. SOCIOLOGY 42 (2013) (discussing the
advantages of qualitative research); Richard Ashby Wilson, The Digital Ethnography of
Law: Studying Online Hate Speech Online and Offline. 3 J. LEG. ANTHRO. 1 (2019) (noting
the ethnographic study of social media hate speech).
14
See infra Part IV.
15
See infra Part V.
16
See infra Part VI.
17
Anti-human rights speech is defined fully in Part V, and includes, inter alia, threats,
accusations of criminality and corruption, dehumanizing language, denigrating statements
about gender or sexual orientation, and other forms of disparaging speech targeting human
rights defenders or organizations.
18
See infra Part VI.
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These empirical findings anchor a theoretical framing that integrates
the two dominant analytical models of online hate speech: what I term the
“Minority Model” and the “Political Model.” The Minority Model, currently
the dominant theory of online hate speech in social science, seeks evidence
for causation or correlation between online speech and physical attacks on
immigrants and minority (religious, racial, ethnic, etc.) social groups.19
Studies in the Minority Model have identified statistical correlations between
online speech and offline violence, thus laying to rest the question of whether
there are offline harms in online hate speech. However, they are limited by
the assumption that social media is comprised of autonomous individual
actors and have paid less attention to the networked, state-sponsored, and
automated nature of social media hate campaigns. This framework needs to
be combined with the Political Model of online speech that is salient in the
law and policy literature and highlights how states and state-aligned actors
commandeer social media to stigmatize and undermine alternative and
dissenting voices.20 In turn, studies in the Political Model could benefit from
the hallmark of Minority Model research, namely, an empirical social science
component that systematically documents the harmful consequences of
online speech.
The theoretical framework guiding this study integrates both models
to analyze online campaigns against human rights defenders who are
challenging impunity for conflict-era crimes or combatting government
corruption. Both approaches have their advantages; the Minority Model is
attentive to questions of causation and direct incitement against religious,
racial, and ethnic groups, and the Political Model addresses both physical
harms and long-term societal effects. Whereas the Minority Model highlights
visible and often spectacular acts of physical violence, the Political Model
highlights non-lethal impacts, including fear, intimidation, and the disruption
and silencing of human rights defenders.
In the two countries studied, the principal consequence of digital
authoritarianism is not direct incitement of violence, although that does
19

Social science studies in the Minority Model. See David Yanagizawa-Drott,
Propaganda and Conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan Genocide, 129 Q.J. ECON. 1947,
1989 (2014); Scott Straus, What Is the Relationship between Hate Radio and Violence?
Rethinking Rwanda’s “Radio Machete,” 35 POLITICS & SOCIETY 609 (2007); Karsten Müller
& Carlo Schwarz, Fanning the Flames of Hate: Social Media and Hate Crime (Jun. 8, 2020)
(unpublished manuscript); see also Griffin Edwards & Stephen Rushin, The Effect of
President Trump's Election on Hate Crimes 6-7 (Jan. 18, 2018) (unpublished manuscript)
(analyzing the effects of political speech during the US presidential elections).
20
For policy studies in the Political Model see, e.g., ABBAS ET AL., supra note 6;
Megiddo, supra note 6; NYST & MONACO, supra note 5, and JONATHAN CORPUS ONG,
JEREMY TINTIANGKO & ROSSINE FALLORINA , HUMAN RIGHTS SURVIVAL MODE: REBUILDING
TRUST AND SUPPORTING DIGITAL WORKERS IN THE PHILIPPINES (2021).
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occur. Instead, digital authoritarianism is a core element of a governmentaligned propaganda campaign to control the public narrative on past and
present human rights violations, and to demoralize and silence civil society
actors. It fosters an atmosphere of tolerance for coercive acts such as the
criminalization of human rights work. Thus, the Political Model is the most
appropriate for understanding coordinated attacks on defenders, but it needs
to draw theoretical and methodological inspiration from the empirically
oriented Minority Model.
The article concludes with a set of recommendations for social media
platforms and national governments that draws from international human
rights law. Social media companies must implement stronger human rightsprotective measures in at-risk countries by creating more channels for urgent
action requests for protection by defenders, adopting content moderation
policies that are context specific, dismantling state-sponsored propaganda
networks, creating mechanisms to document state abuses, and moving away
from a one-size-fits-all model of content moderation. The United Nations
should develop a new Digital Code of Conduct that requires states to adopt
transparency in their digital policies, to refrain from inciting attacks on
individuals or groups, and to cease their illegal surveillance of human rights
defenders.
II.

THE RISE OF DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM

At first, many observers applauded the democratizing potential of social
media. In 2011 and 2012, pro-democracy movements in Egypt, Syria,
Tunisia, and Russia organized mass protests against authoritarian regimes on
Facebook.21 In Latin America, civil society activists quickly mobilized on
social media against government corruption and human rights violations.22
However, governments soon took to social media and adopted the same mass
mobilization practices and a decade later, digital technologies often serve to
consolidate state power.23 Analysts have coined a variety of terms to describe
the range of current online tactics pursued by governments, including;
21

See Deibert, supra note 3, at 65; Zeynep Tufekci, Social Movements and Governments
in the Digital Age: Evaluating a Complex Landscape, 68 J. INT’L AFF. 1 (2014); Zeynep
Tufekci, How Social Media Took Us From Tahrir Square to Donald Trump, MIT TECH. REV.
(Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/2018/08/14/240325/how-socialmedia-took-us-from-tahrir-square-to-donald-trump/.
22
LEOPOLDO FERGUSSON & CARLOS MOLINA, CEDE, FACEBOOK CAUSES PROTESTS
(2019).
23
See Tufecki, How Social Media Took Us From Tahrir Square to Donald Trump, supra
note 23; Deibert, supra note 3, at 65; Sam Gregory, Cameras Everywhere Revisited: How
Digital Technologies and Social Media Aid and Inhibit Human Rights Documentation and
Advocacy, 11 J. HUM. RTS. PRACT. 373, 373–92 (2019).

WILSON

7

“digital repression,”24 “digital domination,”25 and “digital neocolonialism.”26 Government propaganda is, of course, nothing new, but the
immediacy and scale of large-scale surveillance on social media have
fundamentally altered its character, complexity, and capacity.27 That
governments on every continent engage in covert propaganda campaigns
online is no longer in doubt, and social media companies openly acknowledge
this reality. For instance, Twitter regularly updates its “Information
Operations” archive documenting widespread platform manipulation by
governments.28
Many of the forms of state surveillance, censorship, and political
manipulation of social media that are prevalent today were first practiced by
the Chinese Communist Party which created the archetypal model of digital
authoritarianism.29 This began as long ago as the late 1990s, when China
launched its Golden Shield Project; a surveillance system integrating
population databases, identification tracking systems, street surveillance
cameras, and facial recognition software, to which it added digital
surveillance tools.30 The (in)famous “Great Firewall of China” blocks foreign
content, censors speech, and restricts access to certain sites or the internet
altogether.31 These techniques were quickly adopted by countries in the
Middle East and elsewhere.32 Additionally, the Chinese government
imprisoned social media users for violating vague rules against spreading
“online rumors,”33 and countries such as Turkey adopted similar repressive
24

NYST & MONACO, supra note 5, at 9.
Megiddo, supra note 6.
26
William Gravett, Digital Neo-Colonialism: The Chinese Model of Internet
Sovereignty in Africa, 20 AFR. HUM. RTS. L. J. 125 (2020).
27
See JEN WEEDON, WILLIAM NULAND, & ALEX STAMOS, FACEBOOK, INFORMATION
OPERATIONS AND FACEBOOK (2017) (providing Facebook’s analysis of government
information operations).
28
Information
Operations,
TWITTER,
https://transparency.twitter.com/en/reports/information-operations.html.
29
Xiao Qiang, President XI’s Surveillance State, 30 J. DEMOCR. 53 (2019); NYST &
MONACO, supra note 5, at 8; Megiddo, supra note 6, at 10.
30
Xu Xu, To Repress or To Co‐opt? Authoritarian Control in the Age of Digital
Surveillance. 65 AM. J. POL. SCI. 309, 310 (2021).
31
See Qiang, supra note 29; Peter L. Lorentzen, China’s Strategic Censorship, 58 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 402 (2014); Timeline: China and Net Censorship, BBC NEWS (Mar. 23, 2010),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8460129.stm; JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE
INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD (2006).
32
Helmi Noman & Jillian C. York, West Censoring East: The Use of Western
Technologies by Middle East Censors 2010-2011, THE OPENNET INITIATIVE 1 (Mar. 2011),
http://opennet.net/west-censoring-east-the-use-westerntechnologies-middle-east-censors2010-2011.
33
Ben Blanchard, Hui Li & Paul Carsten, China Threatens Tough Punishment for Online
Rumor Spreading, REUTERS (Sept. 9, 2013), https://news.yahoo.com/china-threatens-tough25
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tactics against journalists and activists.34
From 2014 onwards, authoritarian regimes such as China and Russia
shifted their tactics from restricting access and censoring content to coopting
social media and flooding public discourse with pro-government propaganda.
35
The massive surplus of pro-government online speech was wielded as a
“censorial weapon”36 in the information wars, undercutting the ability of civil
society organizations to engage in counter-speech and challenge dominant
narratives. Initially, governments set up networks of automated accounts
(bots) to amplify their message and create the appearance of popular
grassroots support (also known as “astroturfing”), a notorious practice of
Russia’s Internet Research Agency.37 As platforms became more aggressive
in removing bots, government information operations established progovernment youth groups to engage in “patriotic trolling.”38 Digital militias
such as China’s “50 Cent Army” flood social media with nationalist
propaganda, disinformation, and angry rhetoric directed at their political
opponents.39 Smear campaigns against human rights defenders became
common.40 Digital militias do not only drown out opposition voices; by
decentralizing a propaganda campaign, they also obscure the role of the state
and permit “plausible deniability” by political leaders.41 The tactics of digital
authoritarianism are constantly transforming and have progressed from
punishment-online-rumor-spreading-100229793.html.
34
NYST & MONACO, supra note 5, at 35.
35
Deibert, supra note 3, at 65.
36
Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete? KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTE
(Sept. 1, 2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/tim-wu-first-amendment-obsolete.
37
See NYST & MONACO, supra note 5, at 31 (analyzing Ecuador’s contracts with private
companies to set up fake accounts); Megiddo, supra note 6, at 15; SAMANTHA BRADSHAW
& PHILIP N. HOWARD, THE GLOBAL DISINFORMATION ORDER: 2019 GLOBAL INVENTORY OF
ORGANISED SOCIAL MEDIA MANIPULATION 18 (2019); Marco T. Bastos, & Johan Farkas,
Donald Trump is my President! The Internet Research Agency Propaganda Machine, 5 SOC.
MEDIA + SOC’Y 1 (2019).
38
BRADSHAW & HOWARD, supra note 37, at 9; NYST & MONACO, supra note 5, at 11;
Tufecki, How Social Media Took Us From Tahrir Square to Donald Trump, supra note 23,
at 7; Bulut Ergin & Erdem Yörük, Digital Populism: Trolls and Political Polarization of
Twitter in Turkey, 11 INT’L J. COMM. 4093 (2017). Anne Henochowicz, Youth Volunteers to
Spread
Sunshine
Online,
CHINA
DIGITAL
TIMES
(Apr.
13,
2015),
https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/04/translation-youth-volunteers-to-spread-sunshineonline/; Arzu Geybulla, In the crosshairs of Azerbaijan’s patriotic trolls, OPENDEMOCRACY
(Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/azerbaijan-patriotic-trolls/.
39
Gary King, Jennifer Pan & Margaret E. Roberts, How the Chinese Government
Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, not Engaged Argument, 111 AM. J.
POL. SCI 484 (2017).
40
#SmearCampaign,
FRONT
LINE
DEFENDERS
GLOBAL,
https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/violation/smear-campaign.
41
Deibert supra note 3, at 69.
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restricting information to manufacturing an overabundance of speech. Digital
authoritarianism has moved from the firewall to the firehose, and from
suppression to cooptation.42
As China and Russia transformed the central features of digital
authoritarianism, many democratic government security services practiced
intrusive surveillance, including famously by the National Security Agency
(NSA) in the United States.43 Surveillance of independent journalists and
human rights activists is widespread and has become increasingly
sophisticated with the advent of military-grade surveillance software
programs such as Pegasus that are currently available only to governments.44
Surveillance is not without consequences for those being surveilled, and UN
officials have drawn a causal connection between government surveillance
and the detention and torture of activists, and “possibly” extrajudicial killings
as well.45
The techniques of digital authoritarianism have spread to democracies
in tandem with the rise of right-wing populism.46 The number of populist
governments worldwide has doubled since the advent of social media, and
many populist leaders mobilized the constituencies through using graphic
speech online, replete with crude insults, misogyny, racial resentment, and
xenophobia.47 Some of the practices of digital authoritarianism are also
present in classic democracies, including South Korea,48 the United
Christopher Paul & Miriam Matthews, The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood”
Propaganda Model: Why it Might Work and Options to Counter It, RAND CORP. (2016),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE198.html.
43
Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV.
1, 3–4 (2008) (describing the prevalence of state surveillance); Deibert supra note 3, at 75
(discussing NSA surveillance).
44
See Kaye, supra note 4, ¶9 (outlining the use of Pegasus by forty-five governments to
monitor individuals); Washington Post Staff, Takeaways From the Pegasus Project, WASH.
POST (Aug. 2, 2021).
45
David Kaye (Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression), U.N. Doc. A/74/486 ¶ 1(Oct. 9, 2019).
46
See RALPH SCHROEDER, SOCIAL THEORY AFTER THE INTERNET: MEDIA,
TECHNOLOGY, AND GLOBALIZATION 60 (2018) (asserting that digital media were a necessary
precondition for the rise of right-wing and nationalist movements in China, India, Sweden,
and the US).
47
See IVAN KRASTEV & STEPHEN HOLMES, THE LIGHT THAT FAILED: A RECKONING 2023 (2019) (describing the recent rise of populist demagogues and authoritarianism); Ronald
F. Inglehart, & Pippa Norris, Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots
and Cultural Backlash 3, Harvard Kennedy Sch. Paper RWP16-026, (2016); Jonathan T.
Rothwell & Pablo Diego-Rosell, Explaining Nationalist Political Views (Dec. 29, 2017)
(unpublished manuscript).
48
BRADSHAW & HOWARD, supra note 37, at 1, 18; Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras,
U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret
Program, WASH. POST (June 7, 2013).
42
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Kingdom,49 and the United States.50 The line between the digital practices of
democratic and authoritarian governments has become blurred, and
researchers from the Computational Propaganda Research Project found
evidence of “organized social media manipulation” by the government or a
political party in eighty-one countries in 2020.51 There is compelling
evidence that digital authoritarianism intensified over the course of the
COVID-19 pandemic as some governments used the public health crisis as a
pretext to intensify surveillance and stifle freedom of expression online.52 We
can safely conclude that digital authoritarianism is now a generalized feature
of nation-state governance.
Digital authoritarianism has been well-documented in the Political
Model literature produced by policy research centers and international
nongovernmental organizations that have provided detailed reports on statesponsored harassment, surveillance, and censorship of journalists, civil
society organizations, and human rights defenders. However, thus far there
has been a dearth of social scientific research on the concrete effects of statesponsored harassment and the existential consequences for human rights
defenders. The theoretical frame adopted here aims to bridge the Political and
Minority Models by documenting and analyzing the impacts on human rights
defenders of state-sponsored information operations.
III.

RETHINKING THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH

In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, political scientists and
economists applied advanced econometric techniques to determine whether
49

Glenn Greenwald & Andrew Fishman, Controversial GCHQ Unit Engaged in
Domestic Law Enforcement, Online Propaganda, Psychology Research, THE INTERCEPT
(June 22, 2015), https://theintercept.com/2015/06/22/controversial-gchq-unit-domestic-lawenforcement-propaganda/.
50
Lloyd Grove, How Breitbart Unleashes Hate Mobs to Threaten, Dox, and Troll Trump
Critics, THE DAILY BEAST (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-breitbartunleashes-hate-mobs-to-threaten-dox-and-troll-trump-critics (noting how White House
strategist Steve Bannon’s use of partisan news outlets and social media to attack opponents);
see also BRADSHAW & HOWARD, supra note 37, at 9 (describing a USAID-sponsored social
media program in Cuba).
51
SAMANTHA BRADSHAW, HANNAH BAILEY, & PHILIP N. HOWARD, UNIV. OXFORD,
INDUSTRIALIZED DISINFORMATION: 2020 GLOBAL INVENTORY OF ORGANIZED SOCIAL
MEDIA
MANIPULATION
1
(2020),
https://demtech.oii.ox.ac.uk/wpcontent/uploads/sites/127/2021/02/CyberTroop-Report20-Draft9.pdf.
52
Andy Wang, Authoritarianism in the Time of COVID, HARV. INT’L REV. (HIR) (May
23, 2020), https://hir.harvard.edu/covid-authoritarianism/; Kristine Eck & Sophia Hatz, State
Surveillance and the COVID-19 Crisis, 19 J. HUM. RTS 603 (2020); Adrian Shahbaz & Allie
Funk, Freedom on the Net 2020: The Pandemic’s Digital Shadow, FREEDOM HOUSE (2020),
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2020/pandemics-digital-shadow.
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there was a causal connection between inciting broadcasts on Rwandan radio
and mass atrocities.53 With the rise of social media, social scientists adapted
these methods to examine the relationship between online hate speech and
hate crimes against religious, racial, and ethnic groups in North America and
Europe. Studies in the Minority Model present evidence of a correlation
between online hate speech and offline violence against minority groups. For
instance, by analyzing over 500,000 posts and comments on the Facebook
page of the political party Alternative for Germany, Karsten Müller and Carlo
Schwarz find a statistically significant correlation between anti-immigrant
and anti-Muslim posts and offline attacks on Muslims and immigrants in
Germany in 2016.54 Anti-refugee hate crimes were more prevalent in areas
with higher exposure to anti-refugee sentiment online, and this was especially
true for violent incidents such as arson and assault.55
Researchers have identified similar effects in the United States. In a
study of 100 US cities between 2011 and 2016, Kunal Relia et al. find that
hate crimes correlate with tweets containing targeted discrimination on the
basis of race, ethnicity, and national origin.56 Griffin Edwards and Stephen
Rushin found that the inflammatory online rhetoric used by then-candidate
Donald J. Trump in the 2016 presidential election was associated with a
statistically significant increase in reported hate crimes, with the sharpest
increases in counties that voted for Trump by the widest margins.57 Freespeech advocate and Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey defended the social media
company’s decision in January 2021 to de-platform Trump as thus, “Offline
harm as a result of online speech is demonstrably real.”58
Having established a clear correlation between online hate speech and
physical hate crimes, researchers then turned to isolating the mechanisms that
could explain the relationship between the two. Müller and Schwarz found
that Facebook’s algorithm elevated hate posts on users’ feeds, convincing
them that anti-immigrant sentiment was much more widespread in Germany
than it actually was.59 Facebook’s internal studies revealed that their
algorithm, by elevating the visibility of posts that garner more attention,
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Yanagizawa-Drott, supra note 19; Straus, supra note 19.
Müller & Schwarz, supra note 19.
55
Id. at 19.
56
Kunnal Relia et al., Race, Ethnicity and National Origin-based Discrimination in
Social Media and Hate Crimes Across 100 U.S. Cities, ICWSM (2019) (testing the
relationship between social media and hate crimes in the United States).
57
See Edwards & Rushin, supra note 20, at 19.
58
Adela Suliman, Trump Asks Court to Force Twitter to Reinstate His Account, THE
WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2021).
59
Müller & Schwarz, supra note 19; see also Tufekci, Social Movements and
Governments in the Digital Age, supra note 21, at 6.
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promotes violent speech and disinformation on users’ feeds.60 Taken
together, these findings highlight the relationship between the prevalence of
online hate speech and the business model of social media companies, based
as it is on an “attention economy” that thrives on provocation, sensationalism,
and outrage.
Important as these findings are regarding attacks on protected groups
(racial, religious, ethnic, sexual orientation, disability, etc.), there is little
research on attacks orchestrated by state or state-aligned actors on
occupational groups such as journalists or human rights defenders. Attacking
human rights defenders is a hallmark of populist and authoritarian regimes,
but as yet social scientists have not investigated how governments are taking
advantage of the affordances of social media to undermine human rights
work. Furthermore, existing studies of online hate speech mainly focus on
Western Europe and North America and there is little research on the Global
South and in languages other than English.61 Current studies focus primarily
on liberal democracies rather than societies with elevated levels of political
violence, shaky rule of law, and a recent history of armed conflict. Next,
studies in the Minority Model assume that individual users act independently
of one another, and they do not account for the ways in which attacks are
orchestrated by state and state-aligned agencies. State-backed propaganda
campaigns integrate digital militia into cohesive networks and direct them to
harass and threaten specific targets, and the massive levels of coordination
involved alters the scale and nature of the attacks.
Existing studies of online hate speech using machine learning
approaches have produced powerful sociolinguistic insights into the content
of online hate speech. However, they have struggled to keep pace with the
fast-changing nature of online speech and hate speech that is implicit or
coded.62 They usually rely on standardized lists of hate speech (e.g.,
Hatebase.org), although a few recent studies have developed a more
60
Keach Hagey & Jeff Horwitz, Facebook Tried to Make Its Platform a Healthier Place.
It
Got
Angrier
Instead,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Sept.
15,
2021),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-algorithm-change-zuckerberg-11631654215;
see
also Force v. Facebook, 304 F.Supp. 3d 315 (2018) (Katzmann, J., dissenting) (describing
how Facebook’s algorithm amplified the inciting messages of Hamas).
61
The exception being the 2017 genocide in Myanmar that was incited and coordinated
on Facebook by the Burmese military (Tatmadaw); see Paul Mozur, A Genocide Incited on
Facebook, with Posts from Myanmar’s Military, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/technology/myanmar-facebook-genocide.html;
Alexandra Stevenson, Facebook Admits It Was Used to Incite Violence in Myanmar, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 6, 2018) https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/technology/myanmarfacebook.html.
62
Mai ElSherief et al., Hate Lingo: A Target-Based Linguistic Analysis of Hate Speech
in Social Media, ICWSM (2018a); Mai ElSherief et al., Peer to Peer Hate: Hate Speech
Instigators and Their Targets, ICWSM (2018b).
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sophisticated categorization of different linguistic variants of hate speech.63
The methodological requirements of quantitative studies mitigate against a
fine-grained and culturally-informed analysis of the various types of online
hate speech, including anti-human rights speech.
Quantitative studies of the causal effects of online hate speech
necessarily rely on visible outcomes such as hate crimes and lethal acts of
violence. Although international organizations such as Frontline Defenders
track data on non-lethal harms against defenders such as threats, criminal
arrests, and detentions, these have not been analyzed and substantiated in
quantitative social science studies. As noted earlier, the criminalization of
human rights activism is a widespread strategy of illiberal governments
around the world, and UN Special Rapporteur Mary Lawlor observes that
many killings of defenders are preceded by threats and criminalization.64 The
use of social media to promote “lawfare”65 compels us to extend the insights
of social science inquiries into the causal effects of hate speech to also
examine digital authoritarianism.
This entails an inquiry into the broader consequences of online hate
speech and its effects on social norms and political institutions. Campaigns
undertaken by powerful actors may contribute to a climate of intolerance,
impunity, and corruption by eroding social norms against threatening speech,
and fraying bonds of trust and cooperation within and between societal
groups.66 They may undermine a population’s commitment to fundamental
democratic norms such as human rights and the rule of law, and exert a
chilling effect on inquiries into corruption or violations of human rights.67
The suppression of human rights discourse may enable further harms such as
criminalization or physical violence. There is still much work to be done in
documenting the conditioning effects of speech that set the stage for physical
attacks by preparing a population to accept violence.68 Here, speech is less a
63

ElSherief et al., Hate Lingo, supra note 62.
Final Warning: Death Threats and Killings of Human Rights Defenders: Report of the
Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders, Mary Lawlor, Human
Rights Council, 46 U.N. GOAR, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/46/35 (Dec. 24, 2020), p. 5.
65
Understood as the misuse of legal means for political or military ends. See Brooke
Goldstein, Lawfare: Real Threat or Illusion, Address Before The Princeton Club (Nov. 5,
2010)
https://web.archive.org/web/20160112224349/http:/www.thelawfareproject.org/Articlesby-LP-Staff/lawfare-real-threat-or-illusion.html#_ftn2.
66
Michael Bang Petersen, The Evolutionary Psychology of Mass Mobilization: How
Disinformation and Demagogues Coordinate Rather than Manipulate, 35 CURR. OPINION IN
PSYCH. 71 (2020).
67
See DANIELLE K. CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 196-98 (2014) (discussing
the “devastating impact” and chilling effects of online harassment).
68
Molly K. Land & Rebecca Hamilton, Chapter 6: Beyond Takedown: Expanding the
Tool Kit for Responding to Online Hate, in PROPAGANDA AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
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proximate cause than a preparatory act that contributes to the early phases of
a causal sequence that may culminate in violence.
Finally, there has been little systematic analysis of the hidden harms
experienced by human rights defenders that are not tracked in government or
civil society statistics. To this end, I conducted in-depth interviews with
human rights defenders in Colombia and Guatemala, about the effects of
online hate speech on them personally and the context-specific ways that
online harassment affects human rights work in their country. Employing a
qualitative study of human agency enmeshed in hermeneutic “webs of
meaning,”69 facilitates the study of consequences that are seldom visible in
the statistics: psychological harms, self-censorship, burnout, and broader
political outcomes such as the undermining of trust in the knowledge claims
of human rights activists and organizations. More broadly, the harmful effects
of hate speech are extensively documented and include emotional duress,
poor health, and diminished educational outcomes for individuals who are
targeted.70
First, I conducted eighty-one semi-structured interviews;71 fifty-six
with human rights defenders (thirty-nine from Colombia and Guatemala, and
seventeen from Ireland, Nigeria, the Philippines, Serbia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States); twelve with journalists from Colombia,
Guatemala, the Philippines, and the United States; ten with representatives of
national governments of Colombia or Guatemala, or international agencies
such the United Nations or Inter-American Commission working in these two
countries; and three with academic experts on social media. Additionally,
there were regular informal conversations with eleven staff from
Facebook/Meta and Twitter about their hate speech and content moderation
policies.72
LAW: FROM COGNITION TO CRIMINALITY 143 (Predrag Dojčinović ed., 2020).
69
MARK BEVIR & JASON BLAKELY, INTERPRETATIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE: AN ANTINATURALIST APPROACH 1 (2018).
70
In Harper v. Poway, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals cited seven academic studies
on emotional harms of derogatory speech to justify upholding the right of a school district to
prevent a student from wearing a homophobic t-shirt in the classroom. Harper v. Poway
Unified School Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006). See Koustuv Saha et
al., Prevalence and Psychological Effects of Hateful Speech in Online College
Communities, PROC. ACM WEB SCI. CONF. 255 (2019) (describing the harmful
psychological effects of online hate speech); Martin H. Teicher, Hurtful Words: Association
of Exposure to Peer Verbal Abuse with Elevated Psychiatric Symptom Scores and Corpus
Callosum Abnormalities, 168 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 213 (2010) (outlining long-term
psychological harms associated with verbal abuse).
71
Using a snowball sampling method to identify potential interviewees, the majority of
whom were based in urban areas (86 percent) and female (55 percent).
72
In 2020, Facebook requested my input on their developing policies on implicit hate
speech and COVID-19-related hate speech. These consultations were unremunerated.
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Second, due to the fragmentation and incompleteness of existing data
on attacks on defenders, I created a database of killings of hundreds of
defenders in Colombia and Guatemala in 2020 that included their names, the
date and place of their killing, the identity of the perpetrator (if known), and
the corroborating source of information.73 This helped to determine where
the killings of defenders were happening in the country and identify any
geographic patterns and relation to social media coverage.
Finally, I created a database of anti-human rights speech online by
collecting and hand coding 400 Twitter posts targeting defenders in Colombia
and Guatemala.74 The categories of anti-human rights speech used in the
coding draw upon forms of speech and types of posts identified by human
rights defenders. The interactions between the different categories of antihuman rights speech are also of interest since they help us to understand what
forms of speech frequently appear together and may have interactive effects.
IV.
DIGITAL
GUATEMALA

AUTHORITARIANISM

IN

COLOMBIA

AND

In order to grasp the effects of digital authoritarianism, we have to
understand the historical and political contexts in which human rights
defenders operate. Digital authoritarianism does not operate in a vacuum;
online propaganda accompanies real-world anti-democratic practices such as
the killing of defenders and the criminalization of human rights activism.
Colombia and Guatemala are appropriate contexts for developing a
granular understanding of state information operations and their
consequences for human rights work. Both countries had decades-long armed
conflicts driven by land inequality that resulted in the deaths of over 200,000
citizens and high levels of political violence continue.75 The United States
played a significant role in providing military support and training for
successive Colombian and Guatemalan governments, including military
dictatorships.76 In both countries, well-organized human rights movements
73

The list of sources included United Nations agencies, official government statistics,
reports from human rights organizations, and local press outlets in each country. This
database is available upon request.
74
Database and coding scheme are available from author upon request.
75
Alejandro Castillejo, La Escala Humana de la Herida: Apropiaciones y Traducciones
del Daño en Colombia, in COLOMBIA CONTEMPORÁNEA: MIRADAS DISCIPLINARES
DIVERSAS (Mauricio Nieto Olarte ed., 2017); GREG GRANDIN, THE LAST COLONIAL
MASSACRE: LATIN AMERICA IN THE COLD WAR (2011); GONZALO SÁNCHEZ & RECARDO
PEÑARANDA PASADO Y PRESENTE DE LA VIOLENCIA EN COLOMBIA (2007); RICHARD ASHBY
WILSON, MAYA RESURGENCE IN GUATEMALA: Q'EQCHI' EXPERIENCES (1999).
76
See GUATEMALA MEMORY OF SILENCE: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FOR
HISTORICAL CLARIFICATION CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 19-20 (1999)
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emerged during the armed conflicts and experienced violent repression by
state security services and paramilitaries.77
A hallmark of authoritarianism is the dismantling of the
administrative state,78 and, the accountability mechanisms that investigate
and prosecute corruption and politically motivated crimes by state officials.79
In Colombia and Guatemala, human rights activists are at the forefront of
anti-corruption efforts, for instance, by supporting the UN’s International
Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG). They have also
pushed for criminal accountability for conflict-era mass atrocities committed
by right-wing paramilitaries and the army.80 These human rights campaigns
have exposed defenders to violent repression at the hands of state and private
actors, and after the 2016 Peace Accords in Colombia, the number of killings
of human rights defenders rose sharply from fifty-six81 to ninety-two;82 an
increase of 64 percent. Defenders working in rural areas are regularly at the
highest risk of violence. According to the database created for this study, in
2020 in Colombia, 81 percent of defenders killed were in rural areas, and in
Guatemala in the same year, 100 percent of defenders killed were in rural
areas.83 Neither country has an effective criminal justice system for
investigating homicides. The 2018 impunity rates are the same in Colombia84
(describing the role of the United States in Guatemala); Julio Ramirez Montañez, Fifteen
Years of Plan Colombia The Recovery of a Weak State and the Submission of NarcoTerrorist Groups? 7 ANALECTA POLIT. 315 (2017) (describing the United States in the
Colombian conflict).
77
Cora Currier & Danielle Mackey, The Rise of the Net Center: How an Army of Trolls
Protects Guatemala's Corrupt Elite, THE INTERCEPT (Aug. 27, 2017),
https://perma.cc/VFU5-4YSK.
78
Gillian E. Metzger, 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 3 (2017) (noting the attack on administrative governance).
79
Samuel Issacharoff, The Corruption of Popular Sovereignty (2020) (NYU School of
Law, Public Law Research, Working Paper No. 20-02 ) (available on SSRN); Nadia Urbinati,
Political Theory of Populism, 22 ANNUAL REV. POL. SCI. 111 (2019).
80
Such as the massacres at Mapiripán in Colombia, and Dos Erres and Rio Negro in
Guatemala.
81
See FRONT LINE DEFENDERS, GLOBAL ANALYSIS 2016 (2017),
https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/resource-publication/2016-annual-report.
82
See FRONT LINE DEFENDERS, GLOBAL ANALYSIS 2017 (2018),
https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/resource-publication/annual-report-human-rightsdefenders-risk-2017.
83
In Colombia in 2020, 247 out of 304 defenders killed were in rural areas (81 percent).
There were twenty-seven defenders killed in urban areas (9 percent). We were unable to find
reliable sources on the location of the remaining 10 percent. In Guatemala, 100 percent of
the fifteen defenders killed in 2020 were based in rural areas.
84
See Parker Asman, Guatemala Impunity Report Shows Limits of Anti-Graft Body,
INSIGHT CRIME (June 18, 2019), https://insightcrime.org/news/brief/guatemala-impunityreport-limits-anti-graft-body/; Michel Forst, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
Situation of Human Rights Defenders, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/43/51/Add.1 (Dec. 26, 2019).
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and Guatemala85; 98 percent. In Colombia, the impunity rate for murders of
defenders has historically stood at 95 percent.86
Anti-human rights speech online is remarkably similar in Colombia
and Guatemala and invokes a Cold War narrative of the patriotic defense of
the nation from foreign, Marxist, and terrorist destabilizers who are common
criminals, not legitimate political representatives.87 In both countries,
governments have sought to mobilize their base online against human rights
activists and opposition figures.88 Revelations have surfaced repeatedly that
Colombian military intelligence surveils and hacks the devices of opposition
political and civil society figures,89 and the president’s office orchestrates a
social media campaign to slander opponents.90 In Guatemala, military
intelligence deploys sophisticated cellphone-hacking and surveillance
software such as Pegasus against human rights activists.91 The leading antihuman rights account in Guatemala from 2016 to 2020 (@LordVaderGT)
was reportedly operated by an associate of former Vice-President Felipe
Alejos Lorenzana, who was sanctioned in 2020 by the Department of State
for corruption under Section 7031(c).92 Furthermore, there is ample evidence
that leading Colombian and Guatemalan anti-human rights figures coordinate
with one another.93
Human rights work is frequently criminalized in both countries. For
85

Asman, supra note 84.
See Forst, supra note 84 (figures are not available for Guatemala).
87
ABBAS ET AL., supra note 6; Gregory, supra note 23.
88
Currier & Mackey, supra note 77.
89
Redacción Judicial, Las “Carpetas Secretas” de Inteligencia Militar: ¿A Quiénes
Iban Dirigidas y Para qué?, EL ESPECTADOR (May 3, 2020 9:56 PM),
https://www.elespectador.com/judicial/las-carpetas-secretas-de-inteligencia-militar-aquienes-iban-dirigidas-y-para-que-article-917751/.
90
La Liga Contra el Silencio, En las Entrañas de una “Bodeguita” Uribista, EL
ESPECTADOR, (Feb. 6 2020), https://www.elespectador.com/politica/en-las-entranas-de-unabodeguita-uribista-article-903239/.
91
See Ángel Sas & Coralia Orantes, Espionaje Ilegal del Gobierno: Aquí Está la
Investigación de Nuestro Diario (Parte I), NÓMADA (Aug. 6, 2018),
https://nomada.gt/pais/la-corrupcion-no-es-normal/espionaje-ilegal-del-gobierno-aqui-estala-investigacion-de-nuestro-diario-partei/?utm_source=nomada_ux&utm_medium=hay_mas_autor (describing the use of Pegasus
by Guatemalan security services).
92
Press Release, US Dept. of State, Public Designation of Current and Former Members
of the Guatemalan Congress Due to Involvement in Significant Corruption (Oct. 28, 2020),
https://gt.usembassy.gov/public-designation-of-current-and-former-members-of-theguatemalan-congress-due-to-involvement-in-significant-corruption/.
93
See e.g., Guatemalan Ricardo Mendez Ruiz’s tweet of his meeting with former
Colombian President Álvaro Uribe; Ricardo Mendez Ruiz (@RMendezRuiz), TWITTER
(Oct.
17,
2018
6:35
PM),
https://twitter.com/RMendezRuiz/status/1052689655353626624?s=09.
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instance, eight human rights defenders were arrested in November 2018 in
San Luis de Palenque, Colombia after protesting the presence of contractors
from the Canadian energy company Frontera Energy on their private lands.94
Frontera Energy privately contracted the Colombian army to protect its
activities, lodged a criminal complaint, and the defenders were arrested for
criminal conspiracy, violence against a public servant, and obstruction of
public roads.95 Two were charged with attempted homicide in connection
with their leadership of protests during 2016 and 2018 in response to the
failure of Frontera Energy to compensate communities affected by
environmental damage.96 The defenders were beaten, arrested, and detained
by the police, and the charges have yet to be proven in a court of law.97 This
is part of a wider pattern and 202 Colombian defenders protecting
environmental rights have been prosecuted since 2012.98 The criminalization
of human rights activists is a practice that is reinforced daily by social media
messaging, as we will see in detail in Part V.
In Guatemala between 2016 and 2020 the Myrna Mack Foundation
documented 323 criminal complaints against fifty-nine defenders.99 In
September 2019, the Guatemalan human rights organization, La Unidad de
Protección de Defensoras y Defensores de Derechos Humanos-Guatemala
(UDEFEGUA), reported ninety-one outstanding arrest warrants for
defenders in the department of Huehuetenango and fifty-two in Alta
Verapaz.100 Frivolous litigation is facilitated by the fact that private citizens
can lodge a criminal complaint (denuncia) against any person for vaguelyformulated crimes such as conspiracy, abuse of authority, violation of the
Constitution, revealing confidential information, sedition, trespass,
defamation, and “illicit association.”101 According to a UN official in
Guatemala, 30 percent of arrest warrants issued against defenders are for
trespass.102 Of the 323 denuncias cited above, fifty-five were initiated by the
pro-military “Foundation Against Terrorism” and the majority of these were
simultaneously released on Facebook and Twitter.103
94
See Forst, supra note 84; Edinson Arley Bolaños, La Detención de Líderes Sociales
que llega a las Naciones Unidas, EL ESPECTADOR (Mar. 4, 2020 6:00 AM),
https://www.elespectador.com/colombia-20/conflicto/la-detencion-de-lideres-sociales-quellega-a-las-naciones-unidas-article/.
95
Forst, supra note 84, ¶ 29.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Fundación Myrna Mack, Red De Impunidad: Persecución Mediática y Jurídica, 66
(2020).
100
Interview with Guatemalan human rights defender (2019).
101
Fundación Myrna Mack, supra note 99, at 70.
102
Interview with UN official (2019).
103
Fundación Myrna Mack, supra note 99, at 67-68.
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When powerful political or economic actors bring denuncias, they are
more likely to lead to prosecutorial investigations, indictments, and warrants
of arrest. Private complaints have resulted in defenders being arrested and
detained without trial for years, as in the cases of Guatemalan indigenous
rights activists Daniel Pascual and Abelino Chub Caal.104 Even if a criminal
complaint against a defender is dismissed as frivolous, the defender may be
detained, jailed, face high legal defense costs, and significant disruption to
their work. In some instances, lawfare tactics force defenders to leave the
country. Former Guatemalan attorneys-general Thelma Aldana and Claudia
Paz y Paz fled Guatemala after a judge issued warrants for their arrest on
spurious charges and Aldana later received asylum in the United States.105
The differences between the countries are also generative of
comparison. Colombia has nearly three times the population of Guatemala,
and its government possesses greater institutional capacity, both militarily
and otherwise.106 The Colombian state’s coercive power is limited, however,
to certain areas of the country, and observers have referred to it as a
“fragmented state” in which different armed actors exert “oligopolies of
coercion” over the territories they control.107 According to CICIG, the
Guatemalan state has been “captured” by organized crime and elements of
the security apparatus.108 In both countries, the state’s involvement in
organized crime is centered on illegal drugs.109 However, Colombia is a net
narcotics producer and exporter whereas Guatemala is positioned as a major
transit country for illegal drugs destined for the United States.110
104
Two Years in Jail for Protecting his Community's Land in Guatemala, INDEPENDENT
CATHOLIC NEWS (Jul. 17, 2021), https://www.indcatholicnews.com/news/42649.
105
Ex-Guatemala Prosecutor Granted Asylum in U.S., AP NEWS (Feb 24, 2020),
https://apnews.com/article/ce4c035ff39ba0f0b2362adaa529194e.
106
Colombia
Population,
WORLDOMETER
(2021),
https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/colombia-population/.
107
Gustavo Duncan, Drug Trafficking and Political Power: Oligopolies of Coercion in
Colombia and Mexico, 41 LATIN AM. PERSPECTIVES 18 (2013).
108
UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION AGAINST IMPUNITY IN GUATEMALA (CICG),
GUATEMALA: UN ESTADO CAPTURADO (2019).
109
A Colombian government internal investigation “Operation Baton” found that army
generals had business links with Mexican drug traffickers and sold information to the FARC
rebels. Unidad Investigativa, Operación Bastón: el Destape de la Corrupción en el Ejército,
EL TIEMPO (May 17, 2020), https://www.eltiempo.com/unidad-investigativa/operacionbaston-que-revela-corrupcion-dentro-del-ejercito-496292. A 2019 Amnesty International
Report identified sixty criminal structures in the highest levels of the Guatemalan state
between 2007-2018: AMNISTÍA INTERNACIONAL, ÚLTIMA OPORTUNIDAD DE JUSTICIA.
PELIGROSOS RETROCESOS PARA LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS Y LA LUCHA CONTRA LA
IMPUNIDAD EN GUATEMALA 4 (2019).
110
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY
REPORT VOL. 1, at 113, 141 (2021).
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The two countries also have markedly different histories and cultures.
Due to its proximity to the United States and smaller size, Guatemala has
experienced greater US influence in its politics, including a CIA-sponsored
coup in 1954 that replaced reformist president Jacobo Árbenz with an anticommunist military dictatorship.111 Colombia’s indigenous population is less
than five percent of the total population, whereas the 2018 Guatemalan
census found that 43 percent of the population identify as indigenous, one of
the highest percentages in Latin America.112 A United Nations-sponsored
truth commission found that in the 1980s, the military regime of Rios Montt
committed genocide against the Maya-Ixíl group.113 Whereas the Colombian
armed conflict ended in 2016, the Guatemalan peace accords were signed
twenty years earlier in 1996, permitting a comparison of the effects on
political discourse of temporal distance from an armed conflict.
V.

THE CONTENT OF ANTI-HUMAN RIGHTS SPEECH

The empirical part of this study began by interviewing Colombian and
Guatemalan defenders about the most frequent tropes of anti-human rights
speech. In their interviews, human rights defenders reported being subjected
to smears online that refer to them as “communists,” “guerrillas,”
“criminals,” and “terrorists” bent on destroying the state.114 They are labelled
narcotics traffickers, and as having undesirable personal characteristics such
as being “disgusting,” “corrupt,” and “violent.” They are accused of treason
and being in the pay of foreign actors such as George Soros. Racism,
misogyny, and anti-LGBTQ+ slurs are common. They are regularly called,
in typically authoritarian language, “enemies of the state” or “the internal
enemy.”115 Death threats that would normally be removed by social media
platforms in the United States and Western Europe often circulate unchecked
in Latin America; for instance, the “Black Eagles,” a group representing
paramilitaries involved in the narcotics trade in Colombia, posts death lists
online that include prominent human rights defenders who they call
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(2019),
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See Forst, supra note 84, ¶ 27.
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Guatemala).
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“guerrillas in disguise” (guerrilleros camuflados).116
In order to better understand the content of anti-human rights speech
online, this study collected and hand coded 400 Twitter posts (200 per
country) between December 2018 and December 2020 in a convenience
sample that included relevant keywords and hashtags and the posts of
prominent defenders and anti-human rights accounts in each country.117
Consistent with grounded theory in social science, and drawing on the
existing social science literature on dehumanization,118 stigmatization,119
revenge,120 and threatening speech,121 I identified twelve distinct categories
of anti-human rights posts. Together, they comprise the overarching category
of “anti-human rights speech.”
1. Direct threats of harm: direct calls to kill or injure an individual
or their family, posting a home address, referring to a death squad, or
images of harm, violence, or death.
2. Implied threats of harm: non-specific calls for something to be
done, wishing harm would befall them, negative statements about life
expectancy, or images indicating the above.
3. Accusations of corruption: direct or implied accusations that a
person or an organization is corrupt or is engaged in fraudulent
activities.
4. Accusations of subversion and terrorism: claims that the person
is a communist, Marxist, terrorist, guerrilla, assassin, or images
indicating the above.
5. Assertions of anti-patriotic behavior: statements that the target
is a traitor, betraying the country or way of life, an enemy of the
116

Colombia:
Águilas
Negras,
INSIGHT CRIME
(Mar.
9,
2017),
https://insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/aguilas-negras/ (analyzing the
Black Eagles); see @ONIC_Columbia, TWITTER (Mar. 11, 2020 3:24 PM),
https://twitter.com/ONIC_Colombia/status/1237821770083840001.
117
All posts were double-blind coded in the twelve categories by two trained coders,
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118
Emile Bruneau, et al., Denying Humanity: The Distinct Neural Correlates of Blatant
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people, or is serving foreign interests.
6. Accusations of criminality: statements that the person is a
criminal, delinquent, bandit, fugitive of justice, part of conspiracy or
criminal network, structure or organization, or calls to charge or jail
them.
7. Surveillance: photos or videos taken in public place without the
knowledge or permission of the target.
8. Doxing: non-consensual release of private or identifying
information, including documents, private images, or other private
materials, with the intention of harassing, shaming, or inflicting harm.
9. Dehumanization: statements or images that the target is nonhuman, including an animal, a virus, or a non-human object.
10. Gender or sexuality-based disparagement: statements that the
person is LGBT+, or questioning a person’s gender or sexuality, or
accusations of sexual perversion.
11. Narratives from the armed conflict: conflict-era slur or denial
of documented massacre, mass atrocity, or other crime during armed
conflict.
12. Stigmatization: insults based on race, ethnicity, national
origin, or statements that the target is disgusting or offensive, or
accusations of mental illness or substance abuse, or images or emojis
conveying the above.
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Figure 1: Categorization of 400 Twitter Posts in Colombia and Guatemala
in 2020
The most frequent categories of anti-human rights speech in
Colombia are 1. Subversion; 2. Criminalization; 3. Stigmatization; and 4.
Corruption. In Guatemala, the main categories of anti-human rights speech
are; 1. Criminalization; 2. Stigmatization; 3. Corruption; and 4. Subversion.
During coding, it became apparent that a majority of posts contained more
than one category of anti-human rights speech. Therefore, I coded all the
types present in a single post and analyzed the interactions between
categories of speech occurring together.122 The visualizations in Figures 2
122

In R, we processed the column with the labels for each post by separating out each
label into its own column. We then checked whether there were two or more labels assigned
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and 3 illustrate the number of times that categories occur together in a single
post. They represent a preliminary Principal Components Analysis that
highlights terms that cluster together and reduces the complexity of a data set
consisting of many interrelated variables to their core attributes.123

Figure 2: Colombia: interaction of categories of anti-human rights speech

to a given post. If they were, we took the “n choose 2” combinations of these labels, which
were not directional. After iterating over every post for both Guatemala (199 posts) and
Colombia (157 posts) separately, we counted the number of times a given combination had
occurred in among the posts and used the “graph” package in R to visualize the 2-way
connections among labels. The width of the bar connecting the labels indicates the strength
of the connection.
123
IAN. T. JOLLIFFE, PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS (2d ed., 2002).
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Figure 3: Guatemala: interaction of categories of anti-human rights
speech
These empirical results support several findings: First, the content of
anti-human rights speech in Colombia and Guatemala is remarkably similar
and stable and accuses human rights defenders of being corrupt, criminals,
and subversives and stigmatizes them. Methodologically, the results also
demonstrate the value of a fine-grained analysis of the content of online hate
speech. Social science studies in the Minority Model have generally used
binary categories, such as Relia et al.’s hate speech/not-hate speech,124 and
Müller and Schwarz’s anti-immigrant speech/not anti-immigrant speech.125
If we go beyond binary approaches to online posts, then we stand a better
chance of grasping the discursive nature of anti-human rights speech.
Second, anti-human rights speech is also highly contextual and
124
125

Relia, supra note 56.
Müller & Schwarz, supra note 19.
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culturally specific. Digital authoritarianism commonly uses coded or
contextually specific speech to evade the content moderation processes of the
platforms. For instance, pro-military social media accounts in Guatemala
refer to the van used for surveillance operations as the “ice cream truck”
(carrito de helados).126 This expression resonates with Guatemalan activists
because of the ice cream truck’s association with military intelligence and
death squads in the 1980s. Yet this term is benign in the Colombian context;
it means literally, “ice cream truck.” Surveillance, including posting photos
of targets in public settings such as restaurants in real time, is prevalent in
Guatemala but absent in Colombia. Likewise, in Colombia, the statement that
someone will “send the motorcycle” (manda la moto) is commonly
understood as a death threat since armed assassins in Colombia often arrive
on a motorcycle. The statement is not considered threatening in Guatemala
where the practice and expression are not prevalent.
Third, the interactions between categories of anti-human rights
speech are pronounced and may be meaningful, although we do not yet fully
understand their significance. In Guatemala, the most frequent combinations
of anti-human rights speech are Corruption-Criminalization, and
Stigmatization-Criminalization-Corruption. The connections between the
Criminalization-Subversion-Stigmatization in Colombia are more
concentrated than in Guatemala. This suggests that in future studies, rather
than examining one category of speech (such as incitement, threat, or
dehumanization), we might instead investigate whether certain combinations
of online speech are jointly sufficient to cause offline harms.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly for this article, the number of
direct and implicit threats including incitement to violence are conspicuously
few. In Colombia, there are fewer threatening posts than in Guatemala, even
though the number of defenders killed in Colombia in 2020 (304) was twenty
times higher than Guatemala (15). This observation is supported by further
analysis of the offline effects in Guatemala of online speech. I conducted a
time-series regression using the database of killings of defenders in 2020 and
data of threatening posts collected on social media and found no statistically
significant correlation between the two.
Therefore, an initial analysis suggests that the frequency of online
threats of violence does not correlate with actual levels of violence. Of
course, the research design could have been flawed. Methodologically, the
relatively low number of threatening posts could be related to the
126

See Ángel Sas & Coralia Orantes, A ellos Espiaba el Gobierno con un Carrito de
Helados, NÓMADA (Aug. 7, 2018), https://nomada.gt/pais/actualidad/a-ellos-espiaba-elgobierno-con-un-carrito-de-helados-la-investigacion-de-nuestro-diario-parte-i/ (discussing
the ‘ice cream truck’ in government surveillance); see e.g. @LordVaderGT TWITTER (Dec.
24, 2020), https://twitter.com/LordVaderGT/status/1342176983569068032?s=19.
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convenience sample, and here, it is worth noting that a quantitative analysis
of attacks on specific occupational groups such as human rights defenders or
journalists is impeded by the relatively low number of posts overall compared
with, say, the 500,000 posts and comments on the anti-immigrant Alternative
for Germany Facebook page in 2016. Additionally, social media speech is a
rapidly moving target as platforms have adopted increasingly aggressive
content moderation measures in recent years and by one estimation now
remove approximately 62 percent of hate speech flagged by users.127 During
the data collection phase of this study, it was apparent that as Twitter’s
content moderation removed more explicit threats, the discourse of statealigned accounts shifted to harassment and denigration.
These findings compel us to question whether the Minority Model’s
emphasis on identifying a causal relationship between online speech and
offline harms is the most appropriate paradigm for comprehending the range
of outcomes of digital authoritarianism. If it is not, then we may have to
employ different methodological techniques to access a broader range of
negative outcomes of online speech.
VI.

THE HIDDEN HARMS OF ANTI-HUMAN RIGHTS SPEECH

The findings of the last section with respect to direct online threats and
their lethal consequences suggest that we might consider in more detail the
non-lethal effects of online speech (such as intimidation and silencing) on
defenders that have been emphasized in the Political Model. This section
summarizes the evidence from qualitative interviews with human rights
defenders, journalists, and UN and government officials in Colombia and
Guatemala. Human rights defenders reported a range of negative effects of
online anti-human rights speech on their professional and personal lives,
including:
A. Fear and Intimidation
An overwhelming majority (92 percent) of Colombian and Guatemalan
defenders interviewed in this study reported experiencing fear and being
intimidated when targeted online. One defender explained, “They use social
media to gain influence and to manipulate your feelings and your psyche.
They make threats to sew chaos . . . because that’s how they control you. . . .
These are psychological operations to make you paranoid and they use fear
to control you. It’s Propaganda 2.0.”128 A journalist reflected that “it causes
127

DIDIER REYNDERS (COMMISSIONER FOR JUSTICE), COUNTERING ILLEGAL HATE
SPEECH ONLINE: 6TH EVALUATION OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT, EUROPEAN COMMISSION
(Oct. 7, 2021).
128
Interview with Guatemalan human rights defender (2018).
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personal instability to live under such pressure,” which he saw as a conscious
governmental strategy of “psychological counterinsurgency.”129 Defenders
underscored how the extraordinary reach and immediacy (or “virality”) of
social media is qualitatively different from traditional media. As a result,
threats feel more personal and invasive of their privacy for some defenders,
as a female indigenous rights activist from Guatemala explained, “The
harassment and death threats on social media began when I denounced a
massacre by the army in my hometown. . . . I got scared about my security
and my family’s security…they profiled my entire family on social media. .
. . Hate speech online is damaging in a way that is very personal and intimate.
The threat is on your phone that is right there next to you.”130 When posts
reveal their home address, identify family members, or contain surveillance
photos of defenders at restaurants, protests, or public meetings, defenders
describe heightened levels of fear. The scope and capacity of surveillance
operations is most apparent when intimate pictures of defenders in foreign
countries appear online. For example, photos of former Guatemalan attorneygeneral Thelma Aldana using a public bathroom in Orlando circulated on
Twitter in December 2019, and the ultra-rightwing Colombian vigilante
Andrés Escobar posted a photo on Twitter of exiled human rights activist
Beto Coral walking with his family in a New York City park in July 2021.131
B. Reputational Damage
Of the defenders interviewed, 90 percent reported that online attacks had
damaged their personal or professional reputation or harmed their credibility.
Defenders perceived online campaigns as an exercise in “character
assassination,”132 and asserted that, “Online hate speech destroys the social
identity of people.”133 Defenders report being accosted in restaurants, public
bathrooms, and airports as members of the public accuse them of offenses
that they read about online, “Many people really believe I am a drug dealer
and that I live off reparations for victims for the conflict.”134 One described
his lengthy experience with online attacks, “There was a campaign in the
press and social media saying ‘This lawyer has received Q60,000 ($7,700)
and is rich.’ It’s not true, we took the case pro-bono. But it does damage,
people read it in the newspapers and ask, ‘Why are you a millionaire?’. . .
The hate starts in one place and then spreads. Ordinary people, as well as
129
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journalists all start to hate you…people start to make comments in bars and
restaurants. My daughter went out with friends who said to her, ‘Your father
is a thief and corrupt lawyer.’”135 Human rights organizations such as the
Colectivo de Abogados José Alvear Restrepo (CAJAR) in Colombia have
become so concerned that their public image is tarnished, they have hired a
public relations firm to make videos challenging the view that they are
“corrupt,” and “delinquents” who “buy witnesses.”136
C. Taking Protective Measures
Over half (54 percent) of defenders reported that attacks on social media
have led them to take a variety of protective measures to safeguard their
physical security and that of their family. They change their pattern of
movements, adopting different routes and modes of travel to and from work.
They stop walking with their back to the flow of street traffic. They install
bulletproof glass in their car. They stop going out to restaurants and attending
public events. A female defender reflected, “Now I always use a pager and
travel with someone. I avoid having a fixed schedule. I tell my family, ‘I’ll
call you at 5PM and if I don’t, then come and look for me.’”137 The InterAmerican Commission of Human Rights (IACHR) has ordered the
Colombian and Guatemalan governments to provide twenty-four-hour police
protection to numerous high profile defenders such as Judge Ramón
Cadena.138 During his interview, Cadena expressed his appreciation for the
armed policeman standing outside his office but wryly observed, “It
diminishes the risk, but nothing will help you if they really want to get
you.”139
D. Interference with Human Rights Work
A majority (54 percent) of defenders indicated that anti-human rights
speech online has impeded their effectiveness in their human rights work.
Damage to their reputation, they maintain, undermines their credibility as a
reliable source, as well as working relationships with clients,
We represent the victims of the massacre of Mapiripán. They
said to the families that we represent that they were deceived
135

Interview with Guatemalan human rights defender (2019).
Interview with Colombian human rights defender (2020).
137
Interview with Guatemalan human rights defender (2019).
138
RESOLUCIÓN 49/2016 MEDIDA CAUTELAR NO. 661-16, COMISIÓN INTERAMERICANA
DE DERECHOS HUMANOS (2016). Other defenders receiving IACHR protective measures
include Thelma Aldana and Helen Mack of Guatemala and CAJAR and Ricardo Calderón
Villegas of Colombia.
139
Interview with Ramón Cadena, International Commission of Jurists, Guatemala City
(2019).
136

30

THE ANTI-HUMAN RIGHTS MACHINE

AUG 2022

by us and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. . . . On
social media they accused us of being “white-collar
criminals,” “thieves” and “corrupt.” They say that this person
is not a real victim. The victims who we represent have come
to doubt our honesty and integrity.”140
Urban defenders describe encountering hostility when traveling in rural
areas, “When our staff go out to communities, they are sometimes met by
community members with machetes saying, ‘We know you from Facebook.
You are traitors receiving funds from international sources.’”141 In rural
Guatemala, villagers have attempted to lynch urban human rights workers
based on false stories circulating on social media.142 Social media attacks can
drive defenders out of the human rights sector altogether and thwart future
job prospects. After the UN anti-corruption agency (CICIG) ended its work
in 2019, there was a coordinated social media campaign threatening former
Guatemalan staff of CICG with incarceration and menaced any employer that
was considering hiring them, “I had no work after CICIG left and was
unemployed. I applied to many jobs including for UN agencies working in
Guatemala and was told, ‘We don’t want anything to do with you guys. Thank
you and goodbye.’”143 At the end of the interview, one human rights attorney
threw up his hands and exclaimed, “They made life impossible!”144
E. The Connection to Physical Harms
Anti-human rights speech online is seen by 51 percent of interviewees as
causally connected to offline attacks. Some defenders made a strong case for
a causal nexus, “These social media campaigns block your work, ruin your
reputation, and prepare the ground for taking your life,”145 and, “Hate speech
in the United States does not lead to violence. Here [in Colombia], it does,
because there is not a gap between what is said and what is done.”146
Defenders advanced many theories about the relationship between antihuman rights speech and offline violence. Some saw a one-to-one causal
connection. When asked to identify specific cases in which online speech
caused offline harms, Colombian defenders referred to the death threats
issued by a shadowy paramilitary group called the “Black Eagles.” Their
pamphlets which are reposted online customarily announce, “Sentenced To
140
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Death. . . . Your time is over. You are going to die.”147 The Black Eagles’
death lists have included human rights defenders and organizations who they
call “communists,” “prostitutes,” “thieves,” “marijuana smokers,” and
“people with AIDS” who will be subjected to “social cleansing” (limpia
social). Guatemalan defenders cite the killing of Jorge Juc Cucul in July 2019
after Facebook posts called him a “robber of energy” and an “enemy of
development” because he advocated for the nationalization of the electricity
grid.148 Rural defenders face much higher risks of violence than their urban
counterparts, and reports from United Nations agencies have explained that
the elevated levels of killings of rural activists correspond with the absence
of the rule of law and state authority in rural areas.149 A Bogotá-based
defender stated, “Our organization was named in a leaflet of the Black Eagles,
and we went to the police and the prosecutors immediately, but we got no
protection from the state. In this case, we didn’t have a problem because we
are in an urban area, but those who had problems were the rural leaders who
have to face the paramilitaries in the territories they control.”150 Guatemalan
defenders cited a public speech in May 2018 by President Jimmy Morales
that referred to human rights activists as “criminals” and in the next month,
eight rural defenders were killed, the highest number in one month that
year.151 Human rights work is especially dangerous for environmental
activists opposing hydroelectric dam projects and multinational mining
operations. Defenders also believe that private security guards are the most
likely initiators of violence, “There is a clear correlation: where there are
resources, there is violence.”152
In contrast, nearly half (49 percent) of interviewees denied that there
is a direct causal nexus between online speech and offline harms. These
respondents noted that interpersonal violence is generalized in Colombia and
Guatemala and that these two countries have among the highest homicide
rates in the Americas and the world.153 Therefore, it is problematic to isolate
147
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any causal role for social media, as a prominent Colombian defender who is
also a spokesperson for Facebook/Meta, indicated, “Threats do not have
physical effects . . . social media companies did not cause the violence. It is
endemic in Colombian society.”154 Many defenders nevertheless identified
the conditioning effects of anti-human rights rhetoric on social media, “The
effects of social media are not usually direct. It is difficult to point to a direct
result. The effects are more structural.”155 Another suggested, “These
enormous campaigns create the appropriate environment for the attacks.”156
Some defenders maintained that anti-human rights speech did not cause
deaths, but justified killings after the fact, “The stigmatizing of defenders
naturalizes the killing of their leaders. . . . If someone is killed, people look
on Twitter and say, ‘Oh they must have done something. They must be FARC
[the main Colombian Marxist guerrilla organization].’”157
F. The Criminalization of Human Rights Work
About half (49 percent) of defenders perceive a connection between
social media and the criminalization of human rights in Colombia and
Guatemala. Digital authoritarianism’s integration of lawfare and social media
is most apparent when a criminal complaint (denuncia) is released online in
a post.158 In most cases, however, there is no indictment or arrest warrant.
This too can impact defenders by placing them in a legal limbo. While the
criminal complaint is outstanding, anti-human rights accounts post that the
defender is “under investigation” or a “fugitive from justice,” casting a pall
over their reputation for probity. A prosecutor investigating corruption of
high-level Guatemalan officials described the effects of a social media
campaign and criminal complaint against her: “They accused me of moneylaundering $15,000 and brought a denuncia before the anti-money laundering
unit of the Justice Ministry. It was obstruction of justice and a pretext to stop
my investigations. The Justice Ministry opened a case and started an
investigation, and I had to recuse myself from the case I was working on [. .
.] The case against me is still not closed [four years later]. A judge could issue
a warrant for my arrest, so I am frightened to return to Guatemala. They want
to make an example of me.”159 Defenders with children can be especially
affected by the legal uncertainty of having a criminal case opened against
them,
details/GHO/estimates-of-rates-of-homicides-per-100-000-population.
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They are using social media to criminalize us . . . to construct
us as the enemy and say indigenous people are invaders and
violent. . . . It creates a climate of fear. Orders of arrest are not
publicly disclosed by law, so we don’t know if there is warrant
out for our arrest. I fear for my newborn child. If they put me
in jail, what will happen to my children?160
The same defender also asserted a connection between the criminalization
of human rights work and the killing of defenders, “Of the twenty-six
defenders killed last year [in Guatemala], all of them had outstanding arrest
warrants.”161
G. Health Effects
Thirty-eight percent of defenders reported a variety of adverse health
effects resulting from online harassment. They described insomnia and
gastrointestinal problems and they attributed this to the fear and social
isolation they have experienced. Most of those suffering from health
complications also reported adverse psychological symptoms, and these were
most acute for defenders who were under surveillance. One defender, who
faced a sustained campaign on social media that accused her of committing
crimes and posted pictures of her in public places, pointed to the
“psychological effects of being watched, being under constant
surveillance.”162 The gender dimensions of online harassment are apparent in
the interviews for this study, as women defenders reported generally higher
levels of stress after being subjected to online harassment and surveillance.163
A group of Guatemalan defenders opposing a gold mining operation spoke
about the health effects of the coordinated information operation against
them,
There was a campaign of defamation against us. They said our
wives were prostituting themselves and finding other men
because we were always out protesting. They used the names
of the women. They wanted to divide us . . . it confused a lot
of people . . . we don’t want to all end up sick.164
H. Silencing Effects
Twenty-six percent of defenders disclosed that they either ceased to speak
160
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in public, publish in the press, moderated their speech or refrained from
expressing their views to the fullest. Some have withdrawn from social media
or ceased posting either temporarily or permanently, and engaged, in the
words of one defender, in “self-censorship.”165 One attorney described a
campaign against him on Twitter in which posts revealed his address,
disclosed his wife’s identity, and conveyed a death threat by posting a picture
of a murdered human rights lawyer with the subtitle, “The same will happen
to you.” When asked if he had altered his activities, he replied, “I should do
my work, and what is good for my country. But I need to be careful. I stopped
publishing articles and stopped criticizing the government. . . . I went to the
US Embassy for a meeting, but I was under surveillance. Within ten minutes
there was a picture of me leaving the Embassy on Twitter.”166
I. Flight from the Country
Eighteen percent of defenders reported either leaving the country
temporarily or permanently, moving family members such as children
abroad, or making significant plans to leave the country such as arranging
travel, taking out a passport and applying for a visa or for asylum in another
country, usually the United States. Two former attorneys-general fled
Guatemala in part because of a coordinated campaign of harassment and
threat on social media. Former attorney-general Claudia Paz y Paz, who
successfully prosecuted former President General Ríos Montt for genocide,
was forced out of the country and now lives in the United States. Former
attorney-general Thelma Aldana, who successfully prosecuted former
President Otto Pérez Molina on corruption charges, was granted asylum in
the United States in 2020.167 Leaving the country is a more viable option for
urban and professional defenders, and many rural defenders do not possess
the resources necessary to apply for asylum. They may still experience
physical displacement within the country according to a Colombian defender,
In the rural areas, it just takes one death threat for people to
leave their home and land. This is the product of fear after so
many attacks by paramilitaries. They are displaced . . . if they
threaten their family, this has the most impact . . . then they
might leave the country.168
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J. Ignoring Online Attacks
Ten percent of defenders indicated that they ignore online attacks and
block accounts that harass them. This approach is most prevalent among
urban, educated defenders who came to prominence in the era before social
media,
I have been in the struggle for twenty-eight years and I am in
my seventies, so I am tough. I block them and don’t care what
they think. I don’t lose sleep; they aren’t going to kill me! But
young people are affected. Some are more sensitive than
others.169
Defenders who disregard online threats are also more likely to reject a
connection between anti-human rights speech and offline harms, “We have a
fluid dialogue with social media companies. The problem of violence is
structural and profound. It is not the responsibility of the social networks to
change the society. It is their responsibility to educate the population.”170
VII. THE
CONDITIONING
AUTHORITARIANISM

EFFECTS

OF

DIGITAL

The central finding from the qualitative interviews conducted for this
study is that digital authoritarianism facilitates a range of harmful but usually
non-lethal outcomes. Non-lethal harms are seldom included in official
government statistics or reports produced by civil society organizations, but
they nonetheless have a substantial impact on defenders and their ability to
undertake human rights work. Many of the negative effects of anti-human
rights speech are inter-locking and reinforce one another; for instance, when
reputational damage interferes with human rights work by undermining the
credibility of a defender who then engages in self-censorship. These might
be termed “indirect effects” of online harassment and threats, but they are as
direct as violent, kinetic harms, albeit less visible and measurable. Taken as
a whole, they may obstruct human rights work on a daily basis as much as
assaults and killings.
Half of defenders interviewed maintain that anti-human rights speech
online facilitates the criminalization of their work, underlining the ways in
which lawfare and digital authoritarianism are integrated. This is obviously
the case when criminal denuncias are released in a tweet, but it may be true
in a broader sense as well. Defenders made a persuasive case in the interviews
169
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for the conditioning effects that shape public discourse. The avalanche of
accusation and counteraccusation, false information, and slander, can have a
cumulatively corrosive effect on public discourse. Defenders point out that
even if they can lodge an effective rebuttal of the accusations against them,
online anti-human rights speech erodes the basis for determinations of truth
and facticity and thereby destabilize the conditions of knowledge more
generally. In the words of one defender, “In the bombardment, no one
believes anything, so no one has credibility.”171 The relativization of truth by
authoritarian political systems has a long political history.
Even though this study has focused on a wide spectrum of harms, it
is important not to dismiss the possibility of a causal nexus between online
speech and offline violence against human rights defenders. Although there
may be specific cases where a post incites a follower to assault or murder a
defender, these instances are rare. Online incitement may create an
atmosphere of tolerance of harms against defenders and may enhance the
coalitional political identity needed for violence.172 In this model, anti-human
rights speech online conditions a population to oppose human rights
defenders and countenance violence against them, rather than directly
inciting the public to commit violence themselves, although this is possible
too.
Digital authoritarianism has effects that are distinctive from hate
speech directed against religious, ethnic, or racial minorities. The Minority
Model, which is prevalent in the social science literature and at the United
Nations, focuses on incitement of physical violence against a minority
population and less on the conditioning effects of speech. The Political Model
emphasizes state involvement in censorship and silencing of dissidents but
seldom analyzes the macro-level societal effects. This study combines
elements of the Political Model and Minority Model to create a theoretical
framing that encompasses the full range of impacts of anti-human rights
speech online. The primary objective of anti-human rights speech is not to
directly incite ordinary citizens to harm or kill defenders, although this does
occur. Rather, in the words of a Colombian defender, its aim is to “control
the narrative” by stigmatizing defenders and undermining their authority and
ability to hold corrupt leaders accountable.173 Some harms of online speech
are related to how it can have a silencing effect on the activities of individual
human rights defenders and on public support for their activities. Further,
when amplified by platforms, anti-human rights speech creates an
environment in which criminalization and violence against defenders are
“En el bombardeo, nadie crea nada, nadie tiene credibilidad.” Interview with
Guatemalan human rights defender (2019).
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more likely to be tolerated.174
VIII.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Free speech advocates have argued that anti-human rights speech that is
merely offensive can be met with long-term strategies of education, digital
literacy, and political counter-speech.175 However, counter-speech
presupposes an equality of arms and a scenario in which individual speakers
interact in the marketplace of ideas independently of one another and in a
political context of rule of law. In many countries of the world, these are not
the actual circumstances on the ground. Instead, state security agencies with
tremendous institutional capacity are orchestrating mass campaigns of
surveillance and harassment against individual journalists, human rights
activists, and political dissidents in contexts where there is widespread
political and interpersonal violence. Regulation, then, is both lawful and
justified when state digital practices break with international laws and norms.
Scholars have accurately pointed out that many of core practices of
digital authoritarianism are prohibited under international law. Tamar
Megiddo, for instance, draws our attention to the potential violations of an
individual’s right to privacy and basic democratic freedoms and rule of law
by the many digital practices of states.176 International human rights law is
strongly supportive of freedom of expression, but permits limitations that are
provided by law,177 necessary to meet a legitimate objective,178 and
proportionate to the interest to be protected.179 Article 19(3) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states that the
only objectives considered legitimate are:
a. Respect of the rights or reputations of others or
b. Protection of national security or of public order, or of
public health or morals. International human rights law does
not permit states to violate the rights of defenders by curtailing
their legitimate democratic speech, by damaging their
reputation, or by inciting violence against them.
Furthermore, Article 20(2) of the ICCPR explicitly prohibits “any
174
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advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to
discrimination, hostility or violence.” Some forms of state-sponsored antihuman rights speech are prohibited by international law, especially those that
draw on national, racial or religious tropes or that incite violence. Instead of
making threats and inciting violence against human rights defenders, states
have an obligation to take positive steps to protect freedom of expression,
equal access to information, and freedom of association for their citizens. The
online activities of approximately half of the world’s states currently impede
the exercise of the basic citizenship rights of their populations.
States must cease and desist from targeting human rights defenders in
their information operations and, under the auspices of the United Nations,
negotiate, sign, and ratify a Digital Code of Conduct. The UN Digital Code
of Conduct should, at a minimum, commit states to ensure transparency in
their digital practices, require them to support freedom of expression and the
exercise of basic citizenship rights online, and prohibit them from threatening
and inciting violence against human rights defenders, and proscribe them
from conducting unfettered surveillance and smear campaigns against their
citizens.180
For their part, technology companies have a duty of care to their over
4 billion users since they presently possess the principal capacity to regulate
state-sponsored campaigns of harassment. Social media companies currently
detect and disrupt some state information operations, especially when they
use networks of bots and engage in “coordinated inauthentic behavior,” but
they do so in an inconsistent manner. Content posted in Bogotá is not
moderated as assiduously as content posted in Boston, and some observers
have concluded that platforms have “neglected the rest of the world, fueling
hate speech.”181
The universal scope and application of platforms’ content moderation
policies mitigates against context-specific policies that can effectively protect
human rights defenders. As a Colombian interviewee remarked, “There’s a
context they don’t know . . . they have a universal policy on hate speech for
the whole world. But speech is local.”182 Platforms must move away from a
one-size-fits-all content moderation policy towards a context-specific
approach that is informed by, and responsive to, the circumstances on the
ground.183 Content moderation policies must facilitate a pluralization of
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speech norms and a decentralization of their operations while conforming to
international human rights principles of freedom of expression, transparency,
accountability, and respect for due process.
Ideally, this means that human content moderation should be
conducted by personnel who are native speakers of the language and who are
familiar with the political and cultural context in which the speech is
occurring. In at-risk countries where human rights defenders, journalists, and
others are repeatedly arrested on criminal charges and killed, social media
companies are advised to open local offices and develop strong “trusted
partner” relationships with civil society groups, including human rights
organizations. Some companies have established internal working groups to
monitor developments in countries with a heightened risk of political
violence in order to assess how the local situation manifests itself on their
platforms, but they need to go further in integrating the offline and online
signals into their risk assessment matrix.
Some platforms such as Facebook/Meta and Twitter currently
conduct an expedited review of posts flagged by local trusted partners and
this practice needs to be adopted more widely. Defenders report that they flag
posts that may violate the platforms’ terms of service but never received a
response. They have sought a line of communication with social media
companies, only to be rebuffed. A leading Colombian journalist remarked
“We report, and nothing happens. Social media companies are very far from
Latin America.”184 In-country offices should be staffed with journalists,
human rights attorneys, and political analysts who understand the political
context, especially during elections when the risk of public violence is
highest. Platforms should not rely on Artificial Intelligence and automated
content moderation alone but should integrate external signals identified by
the local content and analysis teams into the content moderation matrix. Some
companies such as Facebook/Meta include human rights defenders as a
protected category and wider adoption of this policy is warranted.185
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corruption campaigns, and “controlling the narrative” on human rights
violations through social media, then the prospect for democracy is bleak. As
authoritarian and populist politicians make advances worldwide, and as
authoritarian states and illiberal democracies take advantage of the
affordances of social media to coordinate online information operations
against potential sources of opposition, the need to strengthen the protections
for civil society actors and independent voices becomes even more pressing.

